学术报告：Mandatory ESG disclosure, executive incentive and ESG performance

报告时间：4月22日（星期一）上午9:30-11:30

报告地点：沙河校区，学院1号楼102会议室

报告人：潘小飞，伍伦贡大学，副教授

报告摘要：In this study, we investigate the interplay among mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations, executive compensation, and corporate ESG performance. Using a sample of 8,177 firms across 42 countries during the period of 2002-2020, we find that firms subject to mandatory ESG disclosure are likely to adopt ESG contracting for CEOs by 25% after mandatory ESG disclosure, in comparison to other firms. Additionally, we observe that mandatory ESG disclosure alone has a limited impact on corporate ESG performance, while companies that tie CEO compensation to ESG metrics post mandatory ESG disclosure experience noteworthy enhancements in ESG performance, i.e., a 13.64% surge in their ESG environmental score, a 6.36% increase in total waste recycled, and a 1.7% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. This study contributes to the understanding of the economic mechanisms underlying ESG transparency regulations, underscoring the importance of instilling appropriate managerial incentives to realize the regulatory effectiveness of disclosure regulations.

报告人简介：潘小飞，伍伦贡大学商学院金融学副教授，担任商学院研究生主任、当代澳大利亚商业与经济研究中心（CCABES）联合主任。研究兴趣包括企业金融、政治经济学和金融机构。学术论文在多个国际知名期刊上发表，如Review of Finance, Management Science, Research Policy, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, European Accounting Review, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory等。目前担任期刊Emerging Market Review副主编。他因教学和科研成就获得卓越贡献奖（OCTAL Awards）、优秀论文奖等众多奖项。